AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE INTUITIVE NATURE OF PRESENTISM

Kathleen Lynch

Abstract


Presentism, the thesis that only present events and objects exist and that past and future ones do not, maintains a following largely based on the argument that it is intuitively compatible with an everyday perception of time. This intuition is based on the present being the only time that feels it exists, and so is concluded that it is the only time that does. However this paper demonstrates that human time perception does not at all match a presentist account. Variability in the experience of both flow rate and the specious present within subjects‟ conflicts with the view that time has a constant rate of flow and that the present has a constant „size‟. Variability between subjects; such as differences relating to age or circumstance contradict the idea of time as having any metaphysically universal size or rate of flow; constant or variable. It is thus concluded that one‟s perceptions and intuitive responses are not sufficient to support any metaphysical picture of the nature of time.

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