DO CAUSES NEED TO MAKE THEIR EFFECTS PROBABLE IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THEM? THE TENSION BETWEEN N1 AND E5 IN CRAVER’S MECHANISTIC MODEL OF EXPLANATION
Abstract
to intervene, as exemplified by explanations in neuroscience which in his opinion are motivated
by the desire to bring the central nervous system under control. In his discussion of causal
relevancy conditions of mechanistic components Craver asserts that a cause need not make its
effect probable in order to explain it (condition E5). Although this is supported by some
interpretations, Craver’s own is highlighted by his appeal to an example in neuroscience of the
apparently stochastic nature of neurotransmitter release events. I propose the view that this
interpretation of such a causal relevancy condition is contradictory to Craver’s own proposed first
norm of explanation (norm N1): that a good explanation must fully account for the explanandum
phenomenon including varied manifestations of the phenomenon. By defending Craver’s
explanatory motivation of intervention I demonstrate that the attributed cause of a phenomenon
must necessarily make the phenomenon probable in order to effectively explain it.
Keywords
References
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