NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ATTEMPTS TO BIND MORALITY TO HUMAN NATURE
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine recent neo-Aristotelian attempts to tie morality to human nature. I look specifically at the work in this field conducted by Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. In particular, I articulate their distinct use of the word ‘good’ (in the attributive sense), and how in making this move they illuminate what we are doing when we make ethical evaluations. I then look at two pieces written by Julia Annas and Bernard Williams which attempt to criticise the neo-Aristotelian project. I ultimately
defend the neo-Aristotelian argument that moral activity is on par with self-interested behaviour in any evaluation of practical rationality.
defend the neo-Aristotelian argument that moral activity is on par with self-interested behaviour in any evaluation of practical rationality.
Keywords
Aristotle; Morality; Ethics;
References
Annas, Julia. "Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?".
Foot, Philippa. "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15 (1995).
Annas, Julia. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon, 2001.
Annas, Julia. "Rationality and Virtue." Norms, Values, and Society (1994): pp.205-13.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. "On the Grounding of the Virtues in Human Nature." In What Is Good for a Human Being?, edited by Jan Szaif. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Williams, Bernard. "Evolution, Ethics, and the Representation Problem." In Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
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